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Wilfred Burchett
F or daring to  tell the story o f  H iroshim a, the K orean and Viet N am  
wars from  the "other side", W ilfred Burchett was often the centre o f  
public abuse. But tim e has not lessened the controversy regarding  
his reputation as one o f  A ustralia's m ost distinguished journalists. 
In reply to  R obert M anne's virulent attack in Q uadran t, Laurie 
A arons writes about the m an and the allegations.
Qadrant and Robert Manne certainly don 't believe in spoiling the ship for a ha 'porth  of tar. Quadrant published Manne's 15,000-word article, "The Fortunes of Wilfrtd Burchett: A New Assessment" in its 
August 1985 issue, and followed up with the trivial 
reminiscences of a certain Edwin Morrisby in its October 
issue. Both articles are vicious assaults on Burchett's 
memory, as could be e xpected from Quadrant which has 
been honoured by financial subsidies from the CIA for its 
commitment to far-right ideology and vigorous pursuit of 
the Cold War.
"Unable to hang a dead man, Manne 
wants to exhume the bones of Burchett's 
reputation as Cromwell's skeleton was 
exhumed and hung on the gibbet to 
satisfy Restoration avengers of his 
'treason' and regicide."
This pursuit of Burchett, two years after his death, is a 
sort o f  left-handed tributed to the man whose work is in 
itself an effective answer to the calumnies. It would 
scarcely merit a reply were the attacks confined to 
Quadrant, but they were blazoned much more widely. The 
Sydney Morning Herald, for example, reported the 
appearance of Manne's article, sensationalising it on 
a billboard which asserted bluntly "Burchett a KGB 
Agent*- a lthough its article added a question mark to  the 
headline. M u rd o ch 's  Australian  ju m p ed  on the 
bandwaggon by publishing Morrisby's  meanderings, 
headlined "Wilfred Burchett and the Question of  the
KGB'. .
Mr. Morrisby's  contribution adds little but malicious 
gossip to M anne's longer piece and therefore merits little
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attention, since its substantive "evidence" boils down to 
what the au thor calls a "gut feeling" This turns out to be 
based on some alleged pillow talk with an unnamed 
Bulgarian woman journalist who, Morrisby claims, told 
him that not only was Burchett working for the Russians 
but his wife Vessa worked for the Bulgarian secret service.
"Manne repeats ad nauseam similar inane 
but malicious gossip to buttress his 
allegations."
This, from a man who then tells us that he sent condolences 
to Vessa on Wilfred s death; a fine sort of hypocrite if he 
really believed this tale!
Apart from this, Morrisby's article is padded out with 
self-advertisement, name-dropping and carefully selected 
anecdotes designed to put Burchett in as unfavourable 
a light as possible. A classic example is his claim that 
Burchett liked dogmeat. apparently hoping that this 
depraved taste which he shares with such peoples as the 
Chinese, Vietnamese and the Bataks of Sumatra will lend 
much-needed substance to his weak support tor Manne's 
central charge.
Manne's long article throws everything, including the 
kitchen sink, into blackening Burchett's memory. His 
indiscriminate enthusiasm to r  throwing the book at 
Burchett reveals both personal venom and addiction to 
overkill. His ideological spleen cannot be assuaged merely 
by proving (to his own satisfaction) that Wilfred Burchett 
was a traitor who "had been giving 'aid and com fort ' in 
Korea to the enemies of  his country at time of war". 
(Quadrant, August 1985, p. 34: later quotes from M anne's 
article give only the page numbers.)
Just as the British ruling class damned Roger Casement 
"  as traitor and homosexual, so M anne condemns Burcheit
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for both "great crimes" and minor peccadilloes. Unable to 
hang a dead man, M anne wants to exhum e the bones of 
Burchett 's reputation as Cromwell's  skeleton was 
exhumed and hung on the gibbet to satisfy Restoration 
avengers o f  his "treason" and regicide.
Scuttlebutt and D ossiers
r M  ' h i s  p o s t h u m o u s  c h a r a c t e r  a s s a s s i n a t i o n ,  
M  masquerading as a reply to Gavan M cCormack's 
article. "An Australian Dreyfus: A re-examination of the 
strange case of Wilfred Burchett, journalist" [Australian 
Society. August 1984), uses every adverse comment the 
au thor can dredge up. He draws avidly on the recollections 
of Burchett's enemies and critics, whether this be mean- 
spirited scuttlebutt garnered from envious journalistic 
colleagues, "evidence" from sworn ideological foes, or the 
"objective" dossiers gathered by A SIO and its predecessors 
on the Burchett family for over 4U years. As well, Manne 
rummages through the Burchett Papers in the National 
Library to select a few quotes from tetters which, he claims, 
susiaiu his accusations.
Mr. M anne’s objectivity m a j  be judged by those whose 
help he acknowledges: Jack Kane of the Demcoratic Labor 
Party, wno appears later in this article; Peter Samuel, who 
attacked Burchett in May 19X5 in The Australian; Richard 
Krygier of the Association for Cultural Freedom; Peter 
Coleman, the Liberal M H R  who tried to procure the 
services of  ournalist Robert Mayne to write articles 
against the left, based on ASIO dossiers to  be supplied 
(illegally) by Ernest O. Redford of that organisation. Bui
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his main helper is Denis Warner, longtime rival and bitter 
political enemy of Wilfred Burchett. With such helpers, 
M anne is not short of accusations to hurl indiscriminately 
at Burchett and his family.
M anne begins at the beginning, with Wilfred's father, "a 
progressive minded lay preacher and auto-didact who 
raised a leftwing family at Poowong in Southern 
Gippsland. One local gossip reported to the authorities 
during the war that on Anzac Day 1934 George and son 
Wilfred had appealed 10 the local Methodist congregation 
to 'show tolerance of that great country Russia'." (p. 27)
"Manne's list o f Burchett's sins ranges 
beyond politics, cataloguing personal 
failings and alleged moral defects/'
Having begun with tittle-tattle passed to ASlO's 
predecessor, strongly reminiscent of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy 's later method of dredging "evidence" from the 
past to condem n the " tra i to rs 'w h o  "lost us China", Manne 
repeats ad nauseam similar inane but malicious gossip to 
buttress his allegations. F rom  this sensible appeal, proven 
correct soon after it was reported as the Soviet Union 
turned the tide of  war, M anne moves on to  sterner stuff.
H e informs us that Burchett was strongly influenced by 
bgon Kisch's defiance of Menzies' eftort to keep him out of 
Australia by jum ping  from his ship at Melbourne (not 
Fremantle, as M anne asserts). Then we find Burchett 
listening " .... with great attention as Robeson told a huge 
rally at Albert Hall in 1937 of racial persecution in the 
United States and racial equality in the Soviet Union" (p. 
28). The point of this is unclear: is M anne suggesting that 
Robeson was lying when he spoke o f racial persecution in 
the United States? After all. Robeson experienced plenty 
of  it then and later; it continues to this day as the Ku Klux 
Klan still rides and Blacks are still persecuted, along with 
even anti-communist Vietnamese.
Manne's list of Burchett's  sms ranges beyond politics, 
cataloguing personal tailings and alleged moral delects. ’ .
"Manne is unworried at a minor 
contradiction or two: 'Don Juan sexual 
adventures' sit alongside 'unnatural 
relationships' just as Burchett allegedly 
performed the remarkable feat of being a 
double agent paid by the KGB and the 
Chinese when the two were at ideological 
loggerheads."
Second-hand  Scandals
urchctt was, for example, "unscrupulous": "Stories 
circulated of  the tricks he played on colleagues to 
advance his career, of Don Juan  sexual adventures I 
and of occasional blackmarketeering"(p. 28). Much of this 1 
scandalmongering comes from Denis Warner, who suffers 
from a disease endemic am ong journalists, the retailing of j 
scandalous stories about colleagues, whether true or false, j
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W arner differs from others so infected only in his 
willingness to relay his second- and third-hand scandals to 
ASIO and other intelligence services. He is the source of 
one such story, stupidly irrelevant even were it true, that 
"Soviet officials were also aware that Burchett was 
drinking like a fish" (p. 40) sourced as "Private 
information from Denis W arner who spoke with a Novosli 
official in ihe early 1960s when passing through Moscow" 
(p. 45). The point of this scandalising is hard to see but. 
having repeated it gleefully, one wonders why Manne 
refrains from quoting the more dam ning Paul Knias, 
former Amreican POW  in Korea, whose blasts against 
Burchett he repeats enthusiastically on other issues.
Kniss swore to the US authorities that
Burchett was drunk every tim e I  saw him . I believe he is a chronic  
alcoholic. He alw ays sat and  drank glass a fter glass o f  straight 
cognac, vodka  an d  wine. He cou ld  have been a drug addict 
because the pup ils  o f  his eyes d ila ted  a n d  looked  like p inpo in ts . 
(A S IO  p a p e rs  A 6 1 19 X R I ,  Hem 15.)
Possibly not even M r M anne risked retailing this absurd 
allegation, realising that too many well-known people, 
from Harrison Salisbury to Henry Kissinger, knew 
Burchett well and noticed neither alcoholism nor d rug  
addiction.
" .... he concedes that Burchett was a 
'talented journalist' but a 'journalist 
without the power of social observation 
and an ideologue without the saving grace 
of imagination'."
W arner's more restrained but second-hand evidence 
seems more respectable, given as it was in "most co­
operative fashion" to ASIO 's ’Principal Section Officer 
B I"on  2 November 1953. during which he promised to "dig 
out the most incriminating examples" of  Burchett 's reports 
and sena them back to A SIO  from Singapore (A SIO  
papers A 6 1 19, XR 1. item 13).
This interview produced another prize piece of gossip 
concerning an American correspondent who, according to 
Warner, "consistently annoyed Burchett and W innington 
b> accusing them of an  unnatural relationship" [ibid)-. 
Shades ot Casement! Of course. Mr M anne is unworried at 
a minor contradiction or  two: "Don Ju an  sexual 
adventures" sit alongside "unnatural relationships" just as 
Burchett allegedly peiformed the remarkable feat of being 
a double agent paid by the KGB and the Chinese when the 
two were at ideological loggerheads.
Warner's charges are detailed in ASIO's bulky Burchett 
dossier, which includes material refuting Manne's maior 
accusations against Burchett, as we shall see. Before 
dealing with these, let us docum ent Manne's other 
repetitions oi scandalous scuttlebutt, beginning with 
"blackmarketeering". We are solemnly treated to 1943 
reminiscences from Ronald M onson retailed to ASIO. 
that "he noticed that Burchett was carrying with him a full 
case of cosmetics and other luxury articles wlv'ih were <n 
short supply in Asia and made no secret ol the fact tha i he 
intended to trade them for personal profit" (page 43 from . 
ASIO document dated 26 October 1953). This is reinforced
by gossip t rom  an unnamed source who told the Christian 
Science Monitor that "during his Berlin period he 
(Burchett) engaged in selling automobiles to Soviet 
officials" (p. 28). M an n t  at least admits he cannoi \ouch  
for the a ccuracy of this piece of scandal hul ihen 
triumphantly asserts "but certainly he was involved in the 
German autom obile  trade, sending home to Melbourne a 
1930s Mercedes Benz registered in the Briiish zone". Such 
moral turpitude is obviously only a step fiom treason.
D am ning with Faint Praise
a ware of, though not practising academic 
/ I  objectivity. Mr Manne occasionally makes 
-Z J .  obeisance to impartiality by grudging admissions 
that Burchett had a few good qualities, but hastily adds a 
bitter qualificat'on each time. Thus, he concedes that 
Burchett w asa  "talented journalist"(p. 29) but "a journalist 
without the power of social observation and an ideologue 
without the saving grace of imagination" (p. 27). Famous 
American correspondent, Harrison Salisbury, whose 
reputation towers above Burchett 's detractors answers 
such dam nation  in his foreword to Burchett's book At the 
Barricades:
Burchett .... had  done epochal reporting from  China, ha d  
survived and  w ritten about an incredible 'long m arch' w ith the  
Briiish fleeing Burm a in to  India ahead o f  the Japanese, a n d  had  
scored a sensational scoop  b i being the first correspondent to  
enter H iroshim a and  bring to  the w orld  the story o f  the A -b o m b  
and the horrors it left in its wake  — the firs I details o fra d ia n o n
1
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illness (denied fo r  a long tim e b y  offic ia l U S sources), t i  v tm  the 
best o f a lifetim e, an d  Burchett's a lm ost laconic account o f how  
he achieved it by  boarding a train jam -packed  with hysterical 
Japanese is a classic. (A t the Barricades, p. vi.)
"Yet the available ASIO material, despite 
this paranoid self-censorsh ip , still 
provides ample evidence to make 
nonsense of Manne's most serious 
charges against Burchett."
I believe that no impartial observer reading Burchett 's 
prophetic account of the meaning of Hiroshima, written 
from the site, could possibly accept Manne's  accusation 
that he lacked imagination, nor that his report could have 
been written by someone "lacking imagination" (The 
report can be read in Burchett's book Democracy with a 
Tommvgun.)
Similarly. Salisbury effectively answers Manne's  earlier 
charge of  "unscrupulous behaviour" towards colleagues: 
Burchett's conventional journalistic com panions have fo u n d  him  
a w ell-inform ed, usefu l source a n d  a warm and  decent friend. 
They alm ost always could  check out a report or a rum our  
regardless o f whether it l i lte d  C om m unist ideology or party  
propaganda. On m ost occasions they g o t a stra ightforw ard  
answer, one w hich  n as trustw orthy a n d  which s to o d  the test o f 
lime.
All ot which go ts  to show that not only beauty lies in the 
eye of the beholder. However, Salisbury has the advantage 
over M anne since he knew and worked with Burchett. 
Manne, instead, relies solely on biased witnesses 
handpicked for t h u r  prejudices.
C ourageous — but a Cow ard
TM  he case is similar when Manne grudgingly admits 
that Burchett had "a reputation am ong hispeers for 
physical courage", only to go on to suggest that, 
nevertheless, he was a bit of a coward, Ii is hard lor Manne 
to ignore Burchett 's reputation, lor e ien  W arner toid 
A SIO  that he was very courageous having been "Machine- 
gunned 'as full of holes as u s ie \e ’ when crossing the 
Iravmddv on a raft, and was the first newspaperman in 
Hiroshima .... He had also taken great risks when ne w asa 
correspondent in Germany before the war. when he 
worked with an underground mo\em en( to assist Jews to 
escape from Hitler's persecution." (ASIO dossier 
A 6 1 19, X RI. item 13.)
Having admitted Burchett's reputation for courage. 
M anne then draws on ASIO's questioning at a New' 
Zealand correspondent who knew Burchett in Korea to 
show’ the opposite, as a lead-in to  his central charge that 
Burchett was a traitor, in the following manner:
M e D onald  .... toh l h im  (B urchett) o f a conversation he hail had  
with a R A A F  captain who had  expressed a desire to drop  
Burchett fr o m  his uircraft .... Burchett m ade light ot all this hu t 
apparently took it seriously. S ix  m o n th s later A SIC) r e v  to ld  then 
B u n  h en  was 'contem plating  ret urn inn to  A ustralia  h u t is 
som ew hat ajraia o j m em bers o j /7  A ir  Squadron ' (p. 36)
Manne then continues:
Burchett hud, o f course, m uch  m ore to  worry about, in regard 
to  his hom ecom ing , m an defam atory articles or air force heavies. 
He knew  tha t fo r  tw o  years he h a d  — in  the classic words o f  the 
English treason law  —  been giving ‘a id  an d  com ]art' in Korea to  
the enem ies o f  his coun try  at the tim e o f war. Perhaps his 
conscience was clear .... hu t no th ing  in his nature equ ipped  him  
fo r  the role o f  m artyr in a treason trial. Having crossed the 
R ubicon. Burchett now  tr ied  to  f in d  som e m eans o f crossing 
back. fp. 36)
Manne thus comes to perhaps the most bizarre of his 
absurd charges: that Wilfred Burchett was prepared in 
September 1953 to "redefect" and "buy his way back to the
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West" by supplying "useful information to American 
intelligence'' (page 36) M anne admits thai this is a "strange 
and hitherto unknown episode in (hi tile 01 Will red 
B urthen" which he "stumbled upon in the ASIO liles on 
Burcheti released in earn  I9N5 under the thirty year rule 
(p
This writer also came across ASlO's Burcheti dossiers 
when examining, lor quite other reasons, newly-released 
ASIO materials (w tiich arc still full of great gaps because of 
ASIO censorship). In a querulous footnote (78 on p.44). 
Manne writes T o r  reasons best known to the Australian 
Archives access to the first part of this telegram (about the 
alleged redelection) has b e e n  withheld."But it is ASIO. not 
the Archives, w hich w ithhcld this page of the telegram, as it 
has withheld many thousands ol us dossiers and thousands 
of pages Irom what material it has released.
" .... his prolific output of books which 
often sold well in the West precisely 
because they dealt with issues of world 
concern, presenting new insights into 
events often clouded by partisan pro- 
American reporting which only too often 
proved to be wishful thinking."
Yet the available ASIO material, despite this paranoid 
self-censorship, still provides ample evidence to make 
nonsense of Marine's most serious charges against 
Burchett. Manne did not see these, apparently; he was too 
intent on picking up only those pieces ol gossip or 
inlormation which suit his case. This methodology is very 
apparent in his treatment of accusations made by some US 
prisoners o f  war against Burchett, retailing every 
allegation possible while completely ignoring the warm 
praise for Burchett coming from the highest ranking 
American captured in Korea. General William Dean.
Soon after his release. Dean wrote an article for the 
Saturday Evening Host in which he says: "lor nearly two 
years he (Bifrchettf made my life liveable by treating me as 
a human being. So I don't think it can be surprising that I 
like him and am grateful to him", adding that he "liked 
Burchett more each time although the Australian 
remained a mystery" (quotes Irom Dean's article arc taken 
from the Melbourne Herald  ol 26 February 1954).
Denn devoted a whole chapter to his relationship with 
Burchett in the book he wrote about his Korean 
experience, expressing warm regard lor the Australian, but 
Manne mentions not a word of this. Perhaps he did not 
know of Dean'* book rnd Us nraise’’ Unfortunately not: he 
refers to Dean's book in a lootnotc (7K on p. 44): "The 
reTerence to Burchett's Czech wife is an error. The same 
error occurs in the book on Korea by the highest-rarking 
American POW. General William Dean, who refers 'o  
Burchett's wife as Bohemian". Bur not a word of Dean's 
attitude to Burchett that would weaken Manne's case.
Dollars and D efection
e now examine Manne's bizarre redefection 
claim, absurd because Burchett had nevei* 
"defected" from the Americans who wanted to
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get him back.
Manne does not name the source of this report, 
probably because ASIO suppressed it; there is nothing but 
the US Military Intelligence assertion that Burchett 
wanted to redefect. But there is hard evidence to the 
contrary, showing that the American authorities sought to 
get him to defect to them and that they placed a very high 
value on winning him over.
The New York Times1 published a long and detailed 
report of its investigation into the Central Intelligence 
Agency's links with and use of the American media The 
report includes details of the CIA's effort to buy Burchett s 
defection duting the Korean Armistice talks, the same 
period in which we are told that Burchett wanted to buy his 
way back with some information!
The reporters wrote in the Times:
A t least once, the agency even used an A m erican  reporter in an  
unsuccessfu l a ttem p t to  induce ano ther reporter to  ’defect'. 
During the A rm istice talks in Korea, sources said, the CIA  
persuaded  Eddie H ym off, then a correspondent fo r  In ternational 
News Service, to  o ffer $100,000 to  W ilfred Burchett, the  
Australian journa list w ho h a d  fo rm ed  a close relationship with  
the N orth  Korean C om m unists.
Mr H y m o ff said that he argued with C IA  officials that Mr. 
Burchett cou ld  no t be won over, and  that p ro ved  to  be the case
Putting this never-denied report into today's terms, the 
CIA wanted Burchett 's defection badly enough to pay him 
a sum worth at least a million dollars today. But the 
unscrupulous Australian blackmarkelcer and used car 
dealer, according to  Manne, now appears as a loolish 
idealist who turns down a fortune offered for his defection, 
only to then allegedly seek a "way back" by giving
information!
Burchett was never mercenary; indeed, money meant 
less to him than to most, as even Mr. Manne admitf 
grudgingly:
/  do no t w ith  to  be m isunderstood  here. Burchett obviously d i  
no t decide to  work fo r  the Chinese C om m unist Party t r 
m onetary gain. A s a ta len ted  journalist he cou ld  have fa re d  ir  
better financially i f  he ha d  rem ained in the West (page 29).
"Putting this never-denied report iito 
today's terms, the CIA wanted Burchtft's 
defection badly enough to pay him a fum 
worth at least a million dollars toda^."
It is hard not to misunderstand Manne, despite his tamest 
p r o te s ta t io n s ,  w hen  he m a k e s  accusa tions  ol 
blackmarketeering. being a paid agent living in contort in 
Peking. Moscow and Hanoi, raking over idle scanJalising 
to blacken Burchett 's name. The only way to understand 
his indiscriminate mixing of trivia with baseless efiarges ol 
crimes like treason and redefection is that he seeks to 
buttress the latter, for which his evidence is so thin, by 
throwing in malicious trivia to build up his own case.
I met Burchett in his allegedly luxurious Moscow 
apartment in Vissotny Dom. in 1965, and at twodomiciles 
in Paris, in 1972 and 1 9 7 7 , stay ingat his home on the latter 
occasion. His lifestyle was scarcely sybaritic; he was 
certainly not rich, though not poverty-stricken either. He 
earned his living through reporting (lor both the orthodox 
Western press and for lefiwing papers) and his prolific
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Burchett at a meeting with Ho Chi Mlnh In Hanoi, 1964.
output of books. These often sold well in the West, 
precisely because they dealt with issues of  world concern, 
presenting new insights into events often clouded by 
partisan pro-American reporting. Burchett s choice of  life 
work was motivated by his beliefs, by a lifelong 
commitment to  reporting events he saw as decisive to 
world history, from on the spot. He was never concerned 
with money-grubbing or even the search for fame, still less 
or plaudits from Establishments anywhere, whether in 
Vashington, Moscow, Peking or Canberra.
Burchett 's life shows that neither economic well-being 
fir his own safety took precedence over his lifelong 
pssion for reporting great world events with a proudly 
a ^ r te d  bias to the cause of peoples fighting for national 
iibration from colonial oppression. He demonstrated this 
byns  second journey, in his late fifties, deep behind the 
USSouth Vietnamese lines to report progress of the 
libestion war at an age when few people would try to 
squeze through even one of  the many small tunnels he 
travesed to within sight and sound of an enemy who 
woulcprize his capture or death as a great victory.
"Burihett's choice of life work was 
motivated by his beliefs, by a lifelong 
comnitment to reporting events he saw as 
decisive to world history, from on the 
spot."
The M ajtr Charges
y y a v i n g  e x a m in e d  m o s t  o f  M a n n e 's  m in o r  
m—m allegations, we turn to his more serious charges and 
■M. M . the evidence he produces for them. His major 
witness is Yuri Krotkov. alias George Karlin, a Soviet 
defector who appeared before a sub-committee of the US 
Senate in 1969 and mentioned Burchett. Krotkov met 
Burchett in 1947 when he (Krotkov) was "formally a 
representative in Berlin of the Soviet Information Bureau 
but actually working with Soviet Intelligence" (p. 38).
Krotkov says he next saw Burchett in Moscow in mid- 
I9S6 when Burchett phoned him and sought his help in
n
~ becominga paid agent of the KGB while working as a 
journalist in the USSR. This unlikely story was certainly 
elicited from Krotkov by his CIA "debriefers" who had 
long pursued Burchett and, as we saw, tried even to buy 
him over, unsuccessfully. In fact, Burchett had decided 
that Moscow was a most interesting place to observe world 
events after the C PSU 's  20th Congress and he sought help 
to establish himself there. What more logical step than to 
contact a journalist he had known in Berlin, working lor 
the Soviet Information Bureau, for such help?
Krotkov claimed. 22 years after he first met Burchett, 
that he knew him as a man "\ery experienced in 
espionage", another  unlikely story considering Burchett s 
action-packed life as a war correspondent spent solely in 
Asia and the Pacificand always with British and American 
forces, never with Soviet armies. But Krotkov's 
unreliability as a witness is best illustrated by the so far 
unpublished outcome of a libel action launched by 
Australian communist, Alec Robertson, against the 
Democratic Labor Party's NSW secretary Jack Kane.
The action arose from an article in th November 19 7 1 
issue of  the D L P  newspaper Focus, which retailed 
Krotkov's testimonv before the US Senate hearing in 1969 
much as it appears in Manne's  article 14 years later, with 
one crucial exception. This exception tollows Krotkov's 
statement that the KGB hesitated about putting Burchett 
on the payroll, wmch Manne reportsas  "a hitch; Kroikov's 
KGB chief had changcd .... and details of the agreed 
arrangement misplaced" (p. 38).
" .... neither economic well-being nor his 
own safety took precedence over his 
lifelong passion for reporting great world 
events with a proudly asserted bias to the 
cause of peoples fighting for national 
liberation from colonial oppression/'
Manne then writes that "From what Krotkov could 
make out, Burchett went in high dudgeon to see a 
representative of  the Australian Communist Party then in 
Moscow" (page 38). The Focus version was much more 
specific: "Finally, the deal was clinched by some visiting 
Australian Com m unist Party delegates understood to be 
Alex Robertson and none other than Ted Hilt" {Focus. 
November 1971).
Kane settled Robertson's action out of court, paying the 
damages of  SI 0 .0 0 0  because this s tatemem was 
demonstrably false. Alec Robertson had never been a 
member o f  a Communist Party delegation to Moscow, 
with or without fed  Hill, and could prove that he had not 
been in Moscow at any of the  times that Krotkov alleged he 
had discussed the m atter with the KGB.
Either M r Kane omitted to  tell M anne that he had been 
forced to m ake a costly climbdown and settle out of court, 
when helping with his Quadrant article, or the latter 
deemed it prudent to leave out this piece of the Krotkov 
story which includes a crucial falsehood that could not 
possibly be a mistake.
The Treason Trial That N ever W as
Australian Left Review
The Life and Times o f Wilfred Burchett
e come now to the allegations of Burchett 's 
" treason ' and his cowardice when faced with the 
threat of a trial for that alleged offence. The 
central fact of this m atter is that two Liberal governments, 
Menzies' and Gorton 's , far from seeking to get hold of 
Burchett to charge him with treason, were desperate to  
keep him out o f  A ustralia. Mi M anne could have 
discovered this when researching ASIO's records, which 
contain many proofs of this concern by the Menzies 
government in 1953 and 1954. One is stated clearly in a 
cable from the External Aflairs Departm ent to the Tokyo 
Embassy which includes the following statements;
Persona! fo r  W alker fr o m  W att 
Your telegram 443 Burchett
Burchett at the Jungle headquarters of the NLF In South 
Viet Nam In 1965.
Matter has been considered at highest level here. For y o u r  
background in form ation . Thorn ton 's recent return to  A ustralia  
raised storm  as to  w hy G overnm ent a llow ed h im  to re tu rn .... I f  a 
second a n d  even m ore no torious C om m unist sym path iser  
returned .... there w ou ld  be public  ou tcry  ....
2. Specific answ ers to  questions in i our paragraph 5 are as 
fo llow s: a) G overnm ent has no t the least desire that Burchett 
should return, m ay have n o  legal p o w er to exclude h im ; bu t will 
do what it can  ....
The same viewpoint was put even more clearly in a letter 
which ASIO 's Director Genera!, Colonel C.C.F. Spry, 
wrote to Attorney-General Spicer on 17 December 1953 
canvassing the whole issue. The final paragraph of this 
eight-page letter reveals his thinking:
I  mav say that I  fe e l  that som e advantage w ou ld  be served i f  a 
public p ro nouncem en t were m ade to the effect that crim inal 
proceedings will b ( in s titu ted  against Burchett ij b ecom es w ithin  
the jurisdiction. 1 do  n o t kn o w  w hether he intends to  return  to  
Australia, bu t /  believe that it is his boast that it is open to  h im  to  
do so. On the o ther hand, I understand  that he becom es d is tu rbed  
when it is suggested tha t he w ould  be unw elcom e in this country. 
There is considerable speculation  am ong those w ho have ha d  
recent dealings w ith h im  as to  w hether or not he desires to  get 
away fro m  the C om m unists —  but it is all speculation. M y ow n  
guess is that Burchett does not kn o w  him self. It m ay well be that 
an announcem ent that he will he prosecu ted  i f  he returns to  
Australia, backed  up. perhaps, by the issue o f  a warrant f o r  his 
arrest, w ould effectively deter h im  fr o m  returning. Furtherm ore, 
such an announcem ent w ou ld  assure the w orld  o f  the  
disapprobation with which the Australian  governm ent views h im  
and his activities. H owever. I  realise that there are otlTer 
considerations requiring to  be w eighed in this connection, and  i 
shall hope to  have the advantage o f discussing the prob lem  with 
vou. (A S IO  dossier A 6 1 19/XR I. Item 14. p. X. emphasis added.) 
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While adm itting that it was "all specula tion ' 'about me 
alleged wish to "redefect". adding his own penn'orth  of 
guesswork, the hawkish colonel nevertheless finds the 
mam merit m announcing prosecution is that this "would 
effectively deter him from returning". Further, there was 
never any possibility of an effective treason charge, for the 
existing Crimes Act made no provision for alleged acts of 
treason outside Australian territory, while a prosecution 
under the 1351 English Treason Act presented insuperable 
difficulties. Both these points were clearly stated in letters 
from ASIO's own principal legal officer, "B.G.T." to 
Colonel Spry, as we shall see latei
"The central fact of the matter is that two 
Liberal governments, Menzies' and 
Gorton's, far from seeking to get hold of 
Burchett to charge him with treason, were 
desperate to keep him out of Australia."
In the event, there was not even an announcem ent of 
intention to prosecute Burchett in order to deter him from 
returning home, although the G orton government did its 
damnedest to keep him out 16 years later. But neither 
Liberal government had the stomach to prosecute him. 
and not mainly because of  deficiencies in the law. That 
distinguished arch-conservative jurist. Sir Garfield 
Barwick, tidied up the law to make sure future "traitors" 
would be caught when he introduced draconian 
amendments to the Crimes Act in I960, including the 
principle of "extra-territoriality". But when Burchett 
returned lo Australia in 1970. having com pounded what 
Manne claims were his "crimes" in Korea by doing the 
same things in Viet Nam — condemning American 
aggression against that country and the Liberal 
government's complicity in that aggression — the Gorton 
government did all it could to keep him out. And when he 
defied them and came back, the Gorton government had 
no more stomach for trying him than did Menzies in 1954.
Gorton threatened to fine the French airline UTA 
$1,000 should it carry Burchett from New Caledonia to 
Sydney without a passport. Defying this ban. flying back 
by chartered plane. Burchett told The Age (20 February 
1970): "I wouldn't welcome a treason trial but I’d gladly 
face one". So much for M an n e 's  assertion that nothing in
" .... there was never any possibility of an 
effective treason charge, for the existing 
Crimes Act made no provision for alleged 
acts of treason outside Australian 
territory."
Burchett 's "nature equipped him for the role of martyr in a 
treason trial'’. Indeed. Burchett went further, suggesting to 
the Gorton government that it set up a special court  of 
inquiry into the allegations made against him. as G orton 
admitted in answering a question from Labor M P. Les 
Johnson, on 4 March 1970. "Mr. Burchett has asked for a 
court of inquiry into some charges against him". Gorton 
said ( Hansard p. 25), but he rejected Burchett 's offer. 
Attorney-General T om  Hughes later that day spelled out 
why the Gorton government was more interested in
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keeping Burchett out than trying him for treason.
Answering a question from Opposition leader Whitlam. 
who asked whether Burchetl had broken any laws of the 
C om m onwealth  or whether any investigation was under 
way now Burchetl was in Australia, Hughes replico 
I d o  n o t propose  to  g ive any opin ion as to  w hether Mr. Burchett 
has broken  any  laws o f  the C om m onw ealth. What I will say, 
how ever, is that /, as principal law officer o f  the Crown, do no t 
propose, as at presen t advised, to  bring any charge against him. 
(Hansard, 4 M arch 1970. p . 31.)
"Attorney-General Hughes made it clear 
that Burchett could not even be charged 
because the Menzies government had sent 
Australian forces into America's war 
against the Vietnamese people without 
declaring war."
Hughes amplified that statement in speaking to the 
adjournm ent later that night, revealing the reason why no 
charge would be brough*: "The answer is that under the 
law as it presently stanas - -  that is, the Crimes Act which 
now has an extra-territorial operation a prosecution for 
the offence of treachery or for the offence of  treason 
cannot be m ounted unless the war is a proclaim ed war and 
there is a proclaim ed enemy." (Hansard, p, 193, emphasis 
added.)
This is much more than a legal quibble, going to the 
heart of the political issues arising from both the Korean 
and Viet Nam wars waged by the United States which 
dragged its unwilling allies into both conflicts, using the 
United Nations in the first one. The knotty legal problems 
reflected the basic political reality which led the Menzies 
and G orton governments to deprive Mr. Manne of what he 
claims would have been "the most important Australian 
'political' trial of the century" (page 37), Attorney-General 
Hughes made it clear that Burchett could not even be 
charged because the Menzies government had sent 
Australian forces against the Vietnamese people without 
declaring war. without "proclaiming" it a war and without 
proclaiming either the Democratic Republic ol'Viet Nam 
or the National Liberation Front as "enemies".
U ndeclared, U nw innable, Unnecessary
J his was no oversight, of course: the Menzies government failed to make these proclamations by deliberate intent, just as it sheltered behind the alleged request from the puppet government of  South Viet 
Nam for Australian troops in 1965. The alleged letter was 
never produced, despite repeated requests; historians must 
wait until 1995 to find out the truth, But whatever remains 
hidden in the archives, the fact remains that Australian 
troops were sent into action long before 1965. as advisers 
and instructors under Brigadier Serong. that proud 
exponent ol going down into the gutter to light ad ir ty  war 
which included formation of assassination squads. Vint 
Nam was a disastrous as well as a dirty war. for the united 
States and Australia, incalculably more so for the 
Vietnamese. The tragedy of it all was that it was an 
unnecessary and unwinnable war, as many people had
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warned. Prominent among these was Wilfred Burchett, 
who never tired of warning against foreign intervention 
and publicising the unshakeable determination of the 
Vietnamese to fight (or their national liberation, as shown 
in his despatch of April 1954 describing the hopeless 
position of the French Army besieged at Dien Bien Phu: 
The tw o serious lessons fo r  the French to  learn fr o m  the actions 
at Dien Bien Phu and  the R ed River Della, i f  th ey  do no t draw the 
correct conclusions fr o m  these lessons ii is on ly  bet uuse o f  their 
slavish obedience to  the American in terventionists: the VBA has 
now  grow n in to  a m odern arm y, equ ipped  with m odern  n eapom  
a n d  troops which have m astered the technique o f  handling these 
weapons The type o f  desperate action wftich the French troops 
are fo r c e d  to  fight at Dien Bien Phu because o f  Navarre's fo lly  is 
one which they will have to  fight repeatedly at their isolated 
ou tposts th roughout Vietnam  and  the rest o f  Indochina.
History records that the French did learn these lessons, 
however reluctantly. But the "American interventionists'’ 
did not, unfortunately for millions of  Vietnamese, many 
thousands o f  Americans and hundreds of Australians who 
died in an  unwinnable war which ended only in the US 
defeat and hasty withdrawal in April 1975. The Australian 
government, in similar "slavish obedience" to the 
Americans, joined in the war they never proclaimed. 
Naturally, they ignored the Burchett warning although it 
was available to them, having been "monitored'’ by the US 
military and passed to ASIO and can be read in iheir 
Burchetl dossier ( A 6119X R 1. item 15, folio 36) along with 
others just as spot-on!
"Burchett reported most effectively and 
prophetically on both the Korean and 
Viet Nam wars, which inflicted deep 
traumas on United States imperialism 
and some of its most powerful leaders, 
from Macarthur to Johnson and Nixon 
and beyond."
The Korean War also presented similar problems for 
ASIO and the Attorney-General in considering the 
Burchett issue. It would be very difficult to prosecute 
under the ancient English Treason Act, as the Attorney- 
General's Department lold ASIO: "I therefore imagine 
that the Solicitor-General will first devote his mind to the 
question whether the Communist forces are the Queen's 
enemies. If they are not, there is an end to the matter f rom 
the point of view of any prosecution" (letter from "B.G.T." 
to Colonel Spry. Burchctt dossier A 6 1 19 X R I,  item 14. p, 
3). This was doubtless a m ajor reason for Attorney- 
General Hughes to rule out a prosecution under the 
Treason act of 1351 during the debate in the House of 
Representatives in March 1970, in these words: "The 
Leader oi the Opposition asked me about the common law 
of treason ,. I have formed the view that the hurdles, 
obstacles and legal difficult iesare of such a character as io 
make th a t  pa r t icu la r  form  of procedure  quite 
impracticable in the circumstances" (Hansard 4 March 
1970, p. 194).
The problem arose because the US war in Korea 
masqueraded as a United Nations "policing" operation; the 
United States did not declare war and neither did Britain
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nor Australia.
Colonel Spry, writing to Prime Minister M en ses  on 8 
September 1953. underlines the dilemma lacing the 
authorities in considering Burctieit's reporting trom  Korea 
in which he had never criticised Australia bui always 
directed his attacks against the United States war machine. 
Spry said in this letter: "1 find his criticisms of the Korean 
war are directed against the United States of America, not 
against Australia."
Potential Threat
r he Men/ies Cabinet, in considering the possibility of prosecuting Burchett, adopted this view expressed by Spry and decided there was no basis for such a 
charge. Its main concern remained to keep Burchett out ol 
Australia because they saw him as a potential threat to 
their fulsome support for the US war in Korea.
That this was the basic motive driving the authorities is 
again confirmed by A S IO s  legal olTicer. B .G T . ' .  who 
sent Colonel Spry a memo suggesting that the Mcnzies 
government should announce its intention to prosecute 
Burcheti for treason. The memo, dated 8 January  1954. 
after suggesting such an announcem ent, explains why:
2. 1 he advantages which m ay be served by such a pronouncem en t 
are —
(a) to deter Burchett f r o m  returning to  Australia: a n d
(b) to indicate the d isapprobation w ith which the governm en t 
regards him  ....
He th en  d iscu sse s  the p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  the  
pronouncement would fail to deter Burcheti;
Tenable views that it w ould  no t he so  effective are  —  ( ! )  that he  
might regara it as a challenge to be accepted (he has a m od icum  o f  
vanity and  som e self-confidence in his m ake-up): a n d  (2) tha t the  
C om m unist leaders in China m ight direct h im  to accept the 
challenge (assum ing they regard him  as expendable)  .... 
(A 6 II9  X R  I . item  14).
"Manne may believe that he can dismiss 
McCormack's work by hurling an 
emotive but really meaningless phrase 
like 'neo-Stalinist reading of post-war 
Asian history' at him."
This rather idle speculation seems tutile since successive 
Liberal governments went to great lengths to keep 
Burchett out of his homeland and deprived him of his 
passport until Labor won office in 1972. precisely because 
they were so sensitive to tne nature of the wars in Korea 
and Viet Nam.
This determination to keep Burcheti out. not let him in 
to face a treason trial which would make them a laughing 
stock, which Mr M anne ignores in the A SIO  dossiers, 
raises the issue of why he pursues some c!ues to possible 
reasons for flogging a horse that was already dead 3 1 years 
ago.
Burchett reported most effectively and prophetically on 
both the Korean and Viet Nam wars, which inflicted deep 
traumas on United States imperialism ana  some of its most 
powerful leaders, from M acarthur to Johnson and Nixon 
and bryond. Viet Nam was a crushing and humiliating 
defeat of the United States and tor all those who believe IT
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is the capitalist super-power which must be supported 
because it is the bastion of the "Free World" as amply 
demonstrated in Nicaragua. El Salvador, Argentina 
Uruguay. Haiti. South Africa, not to mention Grenada 
and a dozen other such examples.
This is the position taken by many Quadrant writers, 
expressed by Peter Coleman and Frank Knopfelmacher in 
the issue carrying the M anne diatribe against Burchett. 
Coieinan asks rhetorically: "But the point remains: we 
want America to be a great and powerful friend. W hat else 
have we got?" (Quadrant. August 1985, p. 7). 
Knopfelmacher echoes this: "America is the only great 
power we h a \e"  (p. 75). The best of good luck to them in 
having Ronald Reagan as intellectual and political 
inspiration: as the shade of  Ngo Dinh Diem could tell 
them, they'll need it.
This attitude of "all the wav" with LBJ. or Nixon, or 
Reagan, or whoever heads the great ana powerfuj friend is 
the point of Manne's bitter attack on Burchett, as it is o f  his 
other target. Gavan McCormack, whom he attacks on 
general grounds of  political ideology, interpretation of 
history and gratuitous bitter personal hostility. M anne 
makes this hostility obvious very early in his article, fo>- 
example in this extract: 'T o  remain silent in the face of 
various efforts to lionise Wilfred B u rche tt .... is to accede, 
without quarrel, to  the caricature of the history of  the 
Cold War and to a neo-Stalinist reading of post-war Asian 
history being taught in our universities by academics like 
Dr. M cCormack" (p. 27).
Continued page 41.
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Mr. Manne may believe thai he can dismiss 
McCormack's work by hurling at him the pejorative but 
meaningless phrase "neo-Stalinist reading of post-war 
Asian history''. 1 have never met Gavan M cCormack and 
know only of his book Cold War Hoi War and his co- 
auihorship of  a book on Japan , but even this small 
acquaintance with his work suggests that the task of 
demolishing his historical work is far beyond Mr. Manne's  
capacities. That is obviously why he shirks the task of 
trying to demolish M cCormack's historical work by 
making, for example, a serious critique of his opponent's  
most impressive book about the Korean War, instead 
choosing to spend months on a futile a ttem pt to blacken 
Wilfred Burchett 's name, using the same weapons of 
character assassiantion and abuse against M cCormack in 
the process.
The choice ol such ignoble means in controversy is 
forced by his abject inability to make such a critique of 
McCormack's interpretation. This would require an 
explanation of  why American policy has failed so 
lamentably in Asia ever since the original decision to 
support the corrupt Chiang Kai Shek regime in China. It 
would require explanation for the absurdities of America's 
China policy in keeping that country out of the United 
Nations for almost a quarter-century, for its reverses in 
Korea and Viet Nam. Equally, it would be necessary to 
explain some of the US "successes" in A sia;forexam ple , its 
CIA-inspired overthrow of Sihanouk in Cambodia and the 
million or more victims of the Suharto  coup in Indonesia.
Above all, it would require rationalisation of  the 
irrational, Australia's slavish support for American 
policies throughout the barren years o f  foreign policy 
under Menzies, Holt, G orton and M cM ahon. Manne 
found this task too  daunting; it seemed easier to attack a 
dead man.
But he fails miserably in this also. It is safe to say that 
Wilfred Burchett will be remembered long after Manne's 
diatribe against him is forgotten. It is not necessary to 
claim that Burchett was invariably correct in his reportage 
on every occasion or from every place to  prove that his 
body of work, including both on-the-spot reportage and 
his many books, will prove invaluable for future historians 
and for those who seek to understand Asia's role in the 
second half of the 20th Century, especially those historical 
events in Asia which the Quadrant school finds impossible 
to explain and galling to accept.
FO O TNO TES
1. Had Mr. Manne not been so one-eyed in perusing ASIO's records to 
sniff out the traitor Burchett, he could have read (he Australian Security 
Report detailing the bitter conflict between Black and white American 
servicemen during the Second World War, precisely because of racial 
persecution. This appears in the ASIO papers (e.g., A373, item 2837).
2. Alan Wmnington was a Briiish left wing journalist also covering Korea. 
Winrington and Burchetl jointly wrote several pamphlets at this time.
3. New York Times, 27 & 28 December, 1977.
Laurie Aarons is a former national secretary of the Communist 
Party of Australia who has concentrated on research and writing 
since retiring from that position in 1976.
1. Of course, if the New Right was not basically different from traditional 
conservatism, it would be hard to explain why its emergence in Australia 
(and Britain) has been preceded by savage fights within the Liberal (and 
Tory) parties.
2. The question of a parallel development, the growth of narrow self- 
interest based on locality, craft, grading and so on, which profoundly 
subverts class solidarity is a related phenomenon given too little attention 
on the left. The days when the words "left” and 'm ilitant* were 
synonymous in the trade union movement are long gone, and this is an 
indication of this shift.
3. A market obviously does have a kind of (ruthlessj efficiency and few 
would want to completely shield public enterprises from its operation. 
Such a shield can mean that, to a degree, ordinary consum ers' views and 
freedom to choose can easily be disregarded. This is most obvious in the 
economies of the USSR and Eastern Europe in which the market plays no 
appreciable role (except in Hungary and Yugoslavia) and its place is 
taken bv bureaucratic olanning.
4. A "wet" Liberal. Senator Chris Puplick, who replied to Carlton, 
characterised the debate as that between 'm echanists and m oralists' ’ 
too much of Jim  Carlton's analysis is preoccupied with a comm itm ent to 
systems', systems m anagement and systems efficiency. There is a belief 
that, provded we have the mechanics of the system right, then the 
outcomes, whatever they are, will be satisfactory and acceptable. 
Liberalism to me requires a far higher moral content and purpose .... '
"The market is not an end in itself." he argues. 'A t all times the ultimate 
test must be whether or not systems, policies or practices actually 
contribute to or restrict the development of individual growth and 
freedom .' (Bulletin, 4 June.) Economic growth ana increasing personal 
deprivation can occur at the same time, he argues, despite the free 
marKeteers' blithe assertions to the contrary
5. The alternative to  the New Right renewal is. of course, the clearer 
emergence of a liberal-democratic strand within the establishment on 
social issues at least. In a neat wa v  this is symbolised by the politics of the 
Australian, which consciously propagandises for the New Right day 
after day; ana The Age/Sydney Morning Herald axis which represents a 
more liberal, relaxed atlituo
.6. See Quadrant. March 1985 for an example of the clashes within the 
Right. Robert Manne virtually accuses Blarney of racism; another 
Quadrant writer. Patrick O'Brien, challenges some of the loopier 
attitudes of 'M ad  Dog* M organ to  Australian history and to the 
environment. John  Stone attacks traditionalist economist Colin Clark 
r'vr being soft on wage cutting and deficit slashing.
7. Marxism Today (Britain, July 1983) gives the following breakdown of 
Thatcher's vote
Group T0 r j  Alliance Labour
Semi-skilled and
unskilled m anual 29 28 44
Skilled manual 39 2 7  35
Unemployed 30 26 45
(The most recent poll at the time of writing shows that 65% of blue collar 
workers support the Hawke Labor government, with just overa  quarter 
(28%) supporting Howard and the Nationals.)
8- Financial Review, 6 August, 1985.
9. Craig M cGregor had this to say in the SMH{1  September): 'E xtrem ist 
positions are not generally popular in the pragmatic desert of. Aussie 
politics. But what the Hawke-Keating axis has done, for all its electoral 
success, has been to detach the AL P somewhat from its traditional union- 
reformist-Left base, ’n the United Stales a similar process has been the 
emergence of a hardhat, working-class conservatism which has detached 
itself trom  its traditional party (the Democrats) and swung over to tne 
Reagan brand of the New Right.'1
10. See Tribune, 23 Ociober. 1985 for ih t BWIU delegates statement; see 
6 November for interview with John Devereaux, ETU president, takinga 
different view, and also the CPA activists statement.
11. F o ra  fuller development, see my recent booklet Socialism in Australia 
— Toward Renewal? iFrom PO Box A7I6, Sydney South 2000 for S3.)
David McKnight is a 
„ ordinal or of Tribune.
Sydney journalist and a former co-
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